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AUTOMATING THREAT SHARING: HOW COMPANIES CAN
BEST ENSURE LIABILITY PROTECTION WHEN SHARING
CYBER THREAT INFORMATION WITH OTHER COMPANIES
OR ORGANIZATIONS
Ari Schwartz*
Sejal C. Shah**
Matthew H. MacKenzie***
Sheena Thomas****
Tara Sugiyama Potashnik*****
Bri Law******
This Article takes an in-depth look at the evolution of cybersecurity information
sharing legislation, leading to the recent passage of the Cybersecurity Information
Sharing Act (CISA) and offers insights into how automated information sharing
mechanisms and associated requirements implemented pursuant to CISA can be
leveraged to help ensure liability protections when engaging in cyber threat informa-
tion sharing with and amongst other non-federal government entities.
INTRODUCTION
For several years on Capitol Hill, cybersecurity policy became sy-
nonymous with liability protection for cyber threat information
sharing.  While it is clear now—and was clear to many of us at the
time—that information sharing is only a small part of the long-term
management solution for ongoing cybersecurity threats, it was
treated as almost a panacea.  On the other hand, privacy and open
Internet groups reacted with great concern to almost any proposal
to address cyber threat information sharing.  In some cases that
level of concern was clearly warranted, but in others it seemed that
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such groups would not support any solution seeking to minimize
liability, even with strong privacy protections in place.
The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (“CISA”), which was
signed into law in 2015, like much legislation, was a compromise
that addressed the main concerns of all sides but left open many
questions for implementation. In its guidance, the Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”), working with the Department of Jus-
tice (“DOJ”), decided to focus on the major goal of the legislation,
promoting the automated sharing of threat information. This deci-
sion helped clarify how information would be shared from the
private sector to the government, but provided less guidance about
how liability would work among private sector actors. A lack of clar-
ity around liability protections for sharing potentially private or
confidential information and antitrust concerns among competing
businesses led the call for legislation.1
For organizations looking to engage in business-to-business cyber
threat information sharing, CISA and its guidance offer liability
protections in a way that protects privacy. However, it takes some
interpretation and an understanding of the law’s history to fully
grasp how best to take advantage of the provisions that promote
information sharing.
In this Article, we offer suggestions for how organizations can
engage in greater automated sharing by offering a window into the
law, its guidance, and legislative history. Part I of this Article pro-
vides a historical overview of the evolution and development of
cyber threat information sharing legislation, including the recent
passage of CISA. Part II discusses the Structured Threat Informa-
tion eXpression (STIX) and the Trusted Automated Exchange of
Indicator Information (TAXII) framework for cyber threat informa-
tion sharing.  Part III discusses the implementation of the DHS
Automated Information Sharing (AIS) capability pursuant to CISA
and its use of STIX/TAXII to facilitate cyber threat information
sharing between the private sector and the federal government.
Part IV examines the various CISA guidance documents issued by
DHS and DOJ and suggests that private sector entities seeking to
share cyber threat information with other private sector entities
should develop processes that closely follow the DHS AIS STIX/
TAXII framework in order to ensure that the liability protections
provided under CISA attach with the information shared.  This sec-
tion also suggests that private entities that use STIX/TAXII alone
1. See David Navetta & Utsav Mathur, Sharing Cyber Threat Information: A Legal Perspective,
ISSA J. (Jan. 2015), http://www.dataprotectionreport.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/489/
2015/01/Sharing-Cyber-Threat-Information_ISSAS0115.pdf.
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without using the AIS limitations to share covered information may
not enjoy the same liability protections.
I. HISTORY
A. Obama Administration 2011 Cybersecurity Legislative Proposal
In the years preceding, and into the Obama administration, the
number of cyber threats and cyber incidents affecting the public
and private sectors continued to rise significantly.  To address this
growing problem, U.S. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and six
U.S. Senate committee chairs asked President Barack Obama to
provide input on the direction of cybersecurity legislation in 2011.2
At that point, approximately fifty cyber-related bills had been intro-
duced in the last session of Congress.3  In May of the same year, the
Obama administration released its Cybersecurity Legislative Propo-
sal (“2011 Proposal”).4  The 2011 Proposal included a
recommendation for legislation providing immunity from civil or
criminal causes of action to businesses, states, and local govern-
ments that engage in voluntary cyber threat information sharing
with the federal government within certain parameters.5
1. Information Sharing and Liability Protection
The 2011 Proposal included a provision that would limit the lia-
bility for businesses that disclose any communication, record, or
other information that they lawfully obtain with a designated office
within the federal government, so long as the records were shared
2. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: Cybersecurity Legis-
lative Proposal (May 12, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/
2011/05/12/fact-sheet-cybersecurity-legislative-proposal.
3. Id.
4. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, LEGISLATIVE LANGUAGE:
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY CYBERSECURITY AUTHORITY AND INFORMATION SHARING
(2011),  https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/
dhs-cybersecurity-authority.pdf [hereinafter 2011 PROPOSAL]; see also OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, LEGISLATIVE LANGUAGE: COMPLETE CYBERSECURITY
PROPOSAL (2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legisla-
tive/letters/law-enforcement-provisions-related-to-computer-security-full-bill.pdf (The
complete legislative proposal addressing several additional topic areas).
5. 2011 PROPOSAL, supra note 4, § 246.
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for the purpose of protecting information systems from cyber-
security threats6 and the business sharing such records removed any
personal information before sharing the records with the federal
government.7 This type of information sharing was relatively com-
mon prior to 2011, but many businesses were not participating
because of liability concerns.8 It was within this construct that the
2011 Proposal included a provision that protected businesses that
shared records with the federal government from civil and criminal
liability.9 This liability protection extended to instances of good
faith reliance on the proposed legislation’s authorization to share
cyber threat information with the federal government or a good
faith determination that the proposed legislation permitted the
conduct at issue.10 The 2011 Proposal also included a provision that
would authorize government agencies to share cyber threat infor-
mation within the agency, with the designated office for cyber
threat information sharing, and with certain private entities.11
2. Privacy Protections
The 2011 Proposal also addressed the protection of individual
privacy in two ways. First, it required businesses and state or local
governments that shared cyber threat information to remove per-
sonal information from any records before sharing them with the
federal government.  Additionally, the 2011 Proposal required the
federal government to develop and review policies and procedures
6. The proposal defined a cybersecurity threat as “any action that may result in unau-
thorized access to, manipulation of, or impairment to the integrity, confidentiality, or
availability of an information system or information stored on or transiting an information
system, or unauthorized exfiltration of information stored on or transiting an information
system.” See 2011 PROPOSAL, supra note 4, § 242(8).
7. 2011 PROPOSAL, supra note 4, § 245(a)(1).
8. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-780, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION: IMPROVING INFORMATION SHARING AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS (2004), http://
www.gao.gov/assets/250/243318.pdf (describing information sharing in 2004).
9. 2011 PROPOSAL, supra note 4, § 246.
10. Id. at § 246(b).
11. The 2011 Proposal would have permitted government agencies to share cyber threat
information with a private entity that is acting as a provider of electronic communication
services, remote computing services, or cybersecurity services. The 2011 Proposal did not
define “electronic communication services” or “remote computing services;” however, it de-
fined “cybersecurity services” as “products, goods, or services used to detect or prevent
activity intended to result in unauthorized access to, manipulation of, or impairment to the
integrity, confidentiality, or availability of an information system or information stored on or
transiting an information system, or unauthorized exfiltration of information stored on or
transiting an information system.” 2011 PROPOSAL, supra note 4, 242(7).
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“governing the acquisition, interception, retention, use, and disclo-
sure”12 of information that businesses or state and local
governments share with it.13 These policies and procedures would
have to: (1) minimize the impact on privacy and civil liberties of
sharing cybersecurity threats with the federal government; (2) rea-
sonably limit the acquisition, interception, retention, use and
disclosure of information related to cybersecurity threats; (3) in-
clude requirements for safeguarding information that can be used
to identify specific individuals; and (4) protect the confidentiality of
information associated with specific individuals to the extent possi-
ble while also informing the recipients of cyber threat information
that the disclosed information may only be used for the specific
purpose of protecting against or mitigating cybersecurity threats or
law enforcement purposes.14
3. Reactions
Industry was generally supportive of the 2011 Proposal. Many
viewed the recommendations as an encouraging step towards creat-
ing uniform procedures for sharing cybersecurity threat indicators.
However, the 2011 Proposal was criticized by both trade associa-
tions and privacy advocates.15  The 2011 Proposal specifically
provided for information sharing between private entities and the
federal government, and between government entities, but did not
address sharing between private entities.16 Additionally, stakehold-
ers were concerned about locating the cybersecurity “portal” within
the federal government, as opposed to creating an independent,
centralized entity to facilitate information sharing.17  Privacy groups
advocated that private network operators, not the federal govern-
ment, should be responsible for monitoring and securing private
sector systems.18 In her testimony before Congress, Leslie Harris,
President and CEO of the Center for Democracy and Technology
12. 2011 PROPOSAL, supra note 4, § 248(a).
13. Id.
14. Id. at §§ 248(a)(1)–(4). The 2011 proposal permitted sharing cybersecurity threat
indicators with law enforcement “when the information was evidence of a crime that has
been, is being, or is about to be committed.”
15. Cybersecurity: Innovative Solutions to Challenging Problems: Hearing Before the  Subcomm. on
Intellectual Prop., Competition & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 56
(2011), (statement of Leslie Harris, President and CEO, Center for Democracy & Technol-
ogy) https://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/printers/112th/112-38_66541.PDF
[hereinafter Harris, Hearing].
16. 2011 PROPOSAL, supra note 4, § 243(c).
17. See Harris, Hearing, supra note 15, at 61.
18. Id.
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(CDT), explained that the proposal raised serious concerns. She
noted that the privacy and civil liberties protections in the proposal
were “weak and principally center[ed] on the purpose limitation:
limiting information sharing to cybersecurity and law enforcement
purposes.”19 She expressed concerns about DHS’s level of discre-
tion with respect to the privacy and civil liberties policies and
procedures and noted that “there is no effective way for an ag-
grieved party to enforce compliance with the policies and
procedures because there is no private right of action for
violations.”20
Additionally, there was substantial debate in Congress about the
2011 Proposal.21 Several members of Congress advocated for in-
cluding information sharing as part of a larger package of bills,
rather than continuing to advance individual cybersecurity bills.22
There was also no consensus in Congress regarding the most appro-
priate federal entity for asserting jurisdiction over information
sharing.23
B. Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA)
In November 2011, Representative Mike Rogers introduced H.R.
3523, the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA),
with 112 cosponsors.24 CISPA brought information sharing back to
the forefront of cybersecurity legislation, aiming to facilitate and
increase cyber intelligence information sharing by private and pub-
lic entities.25 CISPA was a proposed amendment to the National
Security Act of 1947, and required the Director of National Intelli-
gence to establish procedures to allow the intelligence community
to share cyber threat intelligence with private sector entities and
utilities and to encourage the sharing of cyber threat intelligence.26
19. See Harris, Hearing, supra note 15, at 62.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Protecting Cyberspace: Assessing the White House Proposal: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. (2011), https://www.gpo.gov/fd
sys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg67638/pdf/CHRG-112shrg67638.pdf.
22. See id. at 5 (statement by Sen. Susan Collins, member, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec.
& Governmental Affairs).
23. See generally Draft Legislative Proposal on Cybersecurity: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Prot., and Sec. Technologies of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th
Cong. (2011), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg74646/pdf/CHRG-112
hhrg74646.pdf.
24. Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 3523, 112th Cong. (2011).
25. See id.
26. Id.
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CISPA defined “cyber threat intelligence” as “information in the
possession of an element of the intelligence community directly
pertaining to a vulnerability of, or threat to, a system or network of
a government or private entity, including information pertaining to
the protection of a system network from efforts to degrade, disrupt,
or destroy such system or network.”27 CISPA allowed “cybersecurity
providers,” with the express consent of the protected entity, to
share cyber threat information with “any other entity designated by
a protected entity” including the Federal Government.28  Informa-
tion shared with the government was to be provided to the National
Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC)
within DHS.29 Information shared with the NCCIC could be shared
with other federal agencies or departments.30 CISPA prohibited the
federal government from using cyber threat information for regula-
tory purposes.31  Furthermore, CISPA limited the government’s use
of cyber threat information to cybersecurity purposes, for the inves-
tigation and prosecution of cybersecurity crimes, protection against
danger or serious physical threats of harm, and to protect national
security.32
1. Privacy Group Concerns about CISPA
Most of industry actively supported CISPA.33 In a letter to mem-
bers of the U.S. House of Representatives, the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce (speaking on behalf of a coalition of all of the industry
groups that were in favor of the bill) expressed support for CISPA.34
The coalition letter advocated for legislation that would put “timely,
reliable, and actionable information into the hands of business
owners and operators . . . while protecting privacy and civil
liberties.”35
27. Id. § 1104(f)(2).
28. Id. § 1104 (b)(1).
29. See generally id. § 1104(b).
30. See generally id. § 1104(b).
31. See id. § 1104(b)(2)(C)(iii).
32. See id. § 1104 (c)(1).
33. Coalition Letter from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to Mike Rogers and C.A.
Dutch Ruppersberger, Representatives, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 12, 2013),
https://www.uschamber.com/letter/coalition-letter-regarding-cispa.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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Privacy groups, while in favor of improving information sharing
for cybersecurity purposes, had several concerns with CISPA.36 The
CDT was primarily concerned with (1) the broad definition of in-
formation that could be shared with the government; (2) the
potential for the growth of government surveillance of private com-
munications as a result of the bill’s information sharing
mechanisms; (3) the shift in control of government cybersecurity
efforts from civilian agencies to military entities; and (4) the ab-
sence of any limitation on the government’s use of information
shared for cybersecurity purposes.37 A coalition of privacy groups,
including New America Foundation’s Open Technology Institute
and the Electronic Frontier Foundation, among many others,
urged Congress to vote “no” on CISPA, noting many of the same
concerns as CDT.38
2. Statement of Administration Policy on CISPA
On April 25, 2012, the Obama administration released a State-
ment of Administration Policy, which explained that the
administration strongly opposed CISPA and that senior advisors
would recommend that the President veto the bill if presented to
him.39 The Statement of Administration Policy noted that CISPA
did not adequately protect privacy, confidentiality, and civil liber-
ties.40 Unlike the 2011 Proposal, CISPA would have allowed broad
sharing of cybersecurity information with the federal government
without establishing requirements to promote minimization and to
protect personally identifiable information.41  The Statement of Ad-
ministration Policy also noted that CISPA failed to establish
sufficient limitations on the sharing of personally identifiable infor-
mation between private entities and that it did not establish
adequate oversight or accountability measures to ensure that cyber
36. Greg Nojeim, Cyber Intelligence Bill Threatens Privacy and Civilian Control, CTR. FOR DE-
MOCRACY & TECH. BLOG (Dec. 1, 2011) https://cdt.org/blog/cyber-intelligence-bill-threatens
-privacy-and-civilian-control/.
37. Id.
38. Coalition Letter from ACLU et al., to Members of the U.S. House of Representatives
(Apr. 26, 2012), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/coalition_letter_
strongly_urging_no_vote_on_h_r__3523-cispa_-_4_26_12.pdf.
39. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINIS-
TRATION POLICY: H.R. 3523—CYBER INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND PROTECTION ACT (2012),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/112/saphr
3523r_20120425.pdf.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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threat information is used exclusively for appropriate purposes.42
The House passed CISPA in April 2012, but the Senate did not.
CISPA was reintroduced in the following Congress as H.R. 624.43
Again, the House passed the bill in April 2013, but the Senate failed
to advance similar legislation. In January 2015, CISPA was again re-
introduced in the House, but ultimately failed to pass.44
C. Executive Order 13636
In February 2013, recognizing a lack of progress in Congress,
President Obama issued Executive Order 13636, Improving Critical
Infrastructure Cybersecurity.45 Regarding cybersecurity information
sharing, E.O. 13636 contains a provision that requires the Attorney
General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of
National Intelligence to issue instructions “to ensure the timely pro-
duction of unclassified reports of cyber threats to the U.S.
homeland that identify a targeted entity.”46 E.O. 13636 also requires
the Attorney General to establish a process for disseminating cyber
threat information, including “the dissemination of classified re-
ports to critical infrastructure entities authorized to receive
them.”47 Additionally, E.O. 13636 requires the Secretary of Home-
land Security and the Attorney General to work with the Director of
National Intelligence to establish a system for tracking these
reports.48
E.O. 13636 requires the expansion of the Enhanced Cyber-
security Services program to all critical infrastructure sectors.49 The
Enhanced Cybersecurity Services program is a voluntary informa-
tion sharing program created to provide “classified cyber threat and
technical information from the Government to eligible critical in-
frastructure companies or commercial service providers that offer
security services to critical infrastructure.”50 E.O. 13636 also re-
quires that government agencies incorporate privacy and civil
42. Id.
43. H.R. Res. 624, 113th Cong. (2013).
44. H.R. 234, 114th Cong. (2015).
45. Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed.
Reg. 11,739 (Feb. 19, 2013).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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liberty protections into information sharing activities.51 Such pro-
tections should be based on the Fair Information Practice
Principles and other privacy and civil liberty frameworks.52
D. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act
E.O. 13636 focused on interagency sharing but did not fully ad-
dress issues regarding private sector information sharing with the
government.53 Following E.O. 13636, Senate Intelligence Commit-
tee Chairman Richard Burr and Vice Chairman Dianne Feinstein
introduced the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA) in
the Senate on July 10, 2014.54 CISA required the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence, the Department of Defense, and the
Department of Justice to develop procedures to promote the timely
sharing of cyber threat indicators with private entities, non-federal
government agencies, state, tribal, and local governments, the pub-
lic, and entities under threat.55
CISA permitted private entities to monitor and operate defensive
measures to detect, prevent, or mitigate cybersecurity threats or se-
curity vulnerabilities on: (1) their own information systems; and (2)
with authorization and written consent, the information systems of
other private or government entities.56 To protect unauthorized ac-
cess and address privacy concerns, CISA required the federal
government and entities monitoring, operating, or sharing indica-
tors or defensive measures to use security controls to protect against
unauthorized access or acquisition and to remove personal infor-
mation identifying a specific person not directly related to a
cybersecurity threat.57
CISA directed DHS to develop a process for real-time automated
cyber threat indicator and defensive measure information shar-
ing.58 Indicators and defensive measures shared under CISA could
be used to: (1) protect a system or information from a cybersecurity
51. Id.
52. Id. The Fair Information Practice Principles are privacy standards for commercial
websites that collect personal information from or about consumers. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., MEMORANDUM NO. 2008-01, PRIVACY POLICY GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM (2008),
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_policyguide_2008-01.pdf.
53. Due to the limited scope of an executive order, solutions for addressing private shar-
ing with government would have to rely on legislation.
54. S. 2588, 113th Cong. (2014).
55. Id. § 3(a).
56. Id. § 4(a)(1).
57. Id. § 4(d)(2).
58. Id. § 7(a)(2)(B).
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threat or security vulnerability; (2) respond to or mitigate a serious
threat of harm; (3) prevent or investigate a serious threat of harm;
and (4) to identify the use of an information system by a foreign
adversary or terrorist.59 CISA also directed DOJ to develop guide-
lines to assist entities in sharing indicators with the federal
government, including guidance for identifying and protecting per-
sonal information.60 The DOJ was required to establish privacy and
civil liberties guidelines to limit receipt, retention, use, and dissemi-
nation of personal or identifying information.61 The information
sharing provisions under CISA were voluntary.62 The government
could not require an entity to provide information to the govern-
ment.63 Entities that monitored information systems or decided to
share or receive indicators or defensive measures were afforded lia-
bility protections as long as the information was shared in
accordance with the procedures set forth by DHS.64
Similar in scope and intent to the 2011 Proposal, CISA received
broad support from much of the business community and trade as-
sociations.65 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce expressed strong
support for the bill, stating that companies need legal certainty to
promote the sharing of cyber threat information.66 The Chamber of
Commerce viewed CISA as establishing this legal certainty while still
protecting individual privacy interests.67 Opposition to CISA came
from privacy groups and tech companies who expressed concerns
59. See id.
60. Id. § 5(b)(2)(C).
61. Id. § 5(d)(5)(C).
62. Id. § 8(h).
63. Id. § 8(f).
64. Id. § 6(a).
65. See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Bankers Ass’n, ABA Statement on Senate Passage of
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.aba.com/press/pages/
102715cybersecuritystatement.aspx; Press Release, Fin. Services Roundtable, FSR Lauds
House on Passage of Critically-Needed Cyber Threat Info Sharing Bill (Apr. 23, 2015), http:/
/fsroundtable.org/fsr-lauds-house-on-passage-of-critically-needed-cyber-threat-info-sharing-
bills/; Press Release, Large Pub. Power Council, The Electric Power Sector Supports S. 754,
the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA) and Opposes Weakening Amendments
(Dec. 2015), http://www.lppc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Electronic-Power-Sector-
Support-of-S.-754.pdf; Letter from the Protecting Am.’s Cyber Networks Coal. to the Mem-
bers of the U.S. Senate (Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/
documents/files/10.19.15_coalition_s754_cisa_senate.pdf; Letter from the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce to the Members of the U.S. Senate (Oct. 22, 2015), https://www.uschamber.
com/sites/default/files/documents/files/10.22.15.kv_.s754.cisa_.senate.pdf.
66. Letter from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to the Members of the U.S. Senate
(Oct. 22, 2015), https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/documents/files/10.
22.15.kv_.s754.cisa_.senate.pdf.
67. Id.
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about sharing information with the government.68 These organiza-
tions expressed concern that the information shared with the
government could be used to conduct surveillance on individuals,
that the bill imposed inadequate use limitations on the govern-
ment, and that the bill failed to protect personally identifiable
information.69
E. Obama Administration 2015 Cybersecurity Legislative Proposal
Thereafter, in January 2015, the Obama administration updated
its 2011 Cybersecurity Legislative Proposal. The 2015 Cybersecurity
Legislative Proposal (“2015 Proposal”) called for the creation of
“mechanisms for enabling cybersecurity information sharing be-
tween private and government entities, as well as among private
entities.”70 The 2015 Proposal suggested authorizing private entities
to disclose cyber threat indicators to private entities called informa-
tion sharing and analysis organizations (ISAO), the NCCIC, and law
enforcement in conjunction with an investigation.71 Under the pro-
visions of the 2015 Proposal, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
along with the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and other
agency leaders were to select a private entity to identify or develop a
“common set of best practices for the creation and operation of
private information sharing and analysis organizations.”72
With respect to the use and protection of information, under the
2015 Proposal, private entities: (1) could use, retain, or further dis-
close cyber threat indicators solely for the purpose of protecting an
information system; (2) were required to take reasonable steps to
minimize information that could be used to identify specific indi-
viduals and reasonably believed to be unrelated to a cyber threat,
68. Letter from the Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. to the Members of the U.S. Senate
Select Comm. on Intelligence (June 26, 2014), https://cdt.org/files/2014/06/CISA-Letter-
62614.pdf; Press Release, Comput. & Commc’n Indust. Ass’n, CCIA Urges Senate to Improve
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, http://www.ccianet.org/2015/10/ccia-urges-senate-
to-improve-cybersecurity-information-sharing-act/.
69. Id.
70. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL:
UPDATED DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY CYBERSECURITY AUTHORITY AND INFORMATION
SHARING (2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative
/letters/updated-information-sharing-legislative-proposal.pdf [hereinafter 2015 PROPOSAL].
The 2015 Proposal differed from CISA because of its focus on sharing information through
information sharing and analysis organizations. CISA allowed companies to share informa-
tion without becoming an information sharing organization.
71. See id. at §§ 103(a)–(b).
72. Id. at § 104(a).
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and to safeguard information that could be used to identify specific
individuals from unintended disclosure and unauthorized access;
and (3) were required to comply with reasonable restrictions on
subsequent disclosure or retention of cyber threat indicators dis-
closed to other private entities.73
Importantly, the 2015 Proposal designated the NCCIC to receive
and distribute cyber threat indicators from the civilian portal as well
as from federal agencies in as close to real time as possible.74 The
2015 Proposal required the Secretary of Homeland Security and
the Director of the National Institute for Standards and Technology
to “develop a program that supports and rapidly advances the devel-
opment, adoption and implementation of automated mechanisms
for the real time sharing of cyber threat indicators.”75 The real-time
sharing provision also provided that, to the extent feasible, the Sec-
retary of Homeland Security would “ensure that the program relies
on open source software development best practices.”76
The 2015 Proposal also included increased privacy and civil  lib-
erty safeguards, as well as provisions protecting entities from civil
and criminal liability. The legislative proposal exempted all entities
from civil or criminal causes of action for voluntarily disclosing or
receiving a cyber threat indicator consistent with the information
sharing requirements.77 With respect to privacy and civil liberties,
the Attorney General was directed to work with various agencies to
develop policies and procedures governing the receipt, retention,
use, and disclosure of cyber threat indicators.78  The policies and
procedures were to: (1) limit the acquisition, interception, reten-
tion, use and disclosure of cyber threat indicators that are likely to
be linked to specific individuals; and (2) establish public guidelines
to allow law enforcement to use threat indicators for limited
purposes.79
Stakeholders generally supported the recommendations set forth
in the 2015 Proposal.80 The 2015 Proposal promoted information
sharing through organizations rather than directly through the fed-
eral government, relieving fears about the government’s access to
73. Id. at § 103(c).
74. Id. at § 105(a)–(b).
75. Id. at § 105(c).
76. Id.
77. Id. at § 106.
78. Id. at § 107.
79. Id.
80. Aaron Boyd, Industry Backing Obama’s Cybersecurity Agenda, FED. TIMES, (Jan. 19,
2015), http://www.federaltimes.com/story/government/cybersecurity/2015/01/19/indus
try-obama-cybersecurity-legislative-agenda/21994717/.
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information.81 Companies were in favor of sharing information with
each other in order to improve the cybersecurity of all.82
F. Executive Order 13691
Building upon the foundation established in E.O. 13636 and
other administrative documents, in February 2015 President
Obama issued Executive Order 13691, Promoting Private Sector
Cybersecurity Information Sharing (E.O. 13691), encouraging the
development of ISAOs.83 E.O. 13691 provides that ISAO member-
ship can be based on a variety of factors, including sector, sub-
sector, region, or any other affinity, as well as in response to particu-
lar emerging threats or vulnerabilities.84 Additionally, according to
E.O. 13691, an ISAO member may be a member of the public or
private sector, and may be formed as a for-profit or nonprofit en-
tity.85 E.O. 13691 directs the NCCIC to coordinate with ISAOs for
sharing cybersecurity risks and incident information.86
E.O. 13691 directs the Secretary of Homeland Security and other
federal entities to work with a nongovernmental organization to
serve as the ISAO Standards Organization (SO).87  The SO would
identify a “common set of voluntary standards or guidelines for the
creation and functioning of ISAOs.”88 The standards would “further
the goal of creating robust information sharing related to cyber-
security risks and incidents with ISAOs and among ISAOs to create
deeper and broader networks of information sharing nationally,
and to foster the development and adoption of automated mecha-
nisms for the sharing of information.”89 E.O. 13691 explains that
the standards must address, but are not limited to, “contractual
agreements, business processes, operating procedures, technical
means, and privacy protections such as minimization for ISAO op-
eration and ISAO member participation.”90 In accordance with
E.O. 13691, DHS selected the University of Texas at San Antonio to
81. See 2015 Proposal, supra note 70.
82. See supra note 76.
83. Exec. Order No. 13,691, 80 Fed. Reg. 9,349 (Feb. 20, 2015).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 9,350.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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serve the function of the SO with support from the Logistics Man-
agement Institute.91
G. Passage of CISA
Finally, on December 18, 2015, Congress enacted CISA as part of
the Cybersecurity Act of 2015.92 As enacted, CISA was not signifi-
cantly different from the proposed 2014 bill, which facilitated
private information sharing. CISA authorizes private entities to
monitor their own information systems93 and the information sys-
tems of other entities with the permission of the entity that owns
the information system.94 The statute also authorized private enti-
ties to use defensive measures to protect its own information system
or information systems belonging to other entities with the permis-
sion of the other entity.95 CISA further authorizes private entities to
share cyber threat indicators96 and defensive measures97 with, or re-
ceive such information from, any other entity or the federal
91. Andy Ozment, DHS Awards Grant for Creation of the Information Sharing and Analysis
Organization (ISAO) Standards Organization (SO), U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. BLOG (Sept. 3,
2015, 2:50 PM), https://www.dhs.gov/blog/2015/09/03/dhs-awards-grant-creation-informa
tion-sharing-and-analysis-organization-isao.
92. 6 U.S.C. §§ 1501–10 (2012).
93. Information system means “a discrete set of information resources organized for the
collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition of informa-
tion, including industrial control systems, such as supervisory control and data acquisition
systems, distributed control systems, and programmable logic controllers.” 6 U.S.C.
§ 1501(9).
94. 6 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (2012).
95. 6 U.S.C. § 1503(b) (2012).
96. Cyber Threat Indicators means “information that is necessary to describe or identify:
(A) malicious reconnaissance, including anomalous patterns of communications that appear
to be transmitted for the purpose of gathering technical information related to a cyber-
security threat or security vulnerability; (B) a method of defeating a security control or
exploitation of a security vulnerability; (C) a security vulnerability, including anomalous ac-
tivity that appears to indicate the existence of a security vulnerability; (D) a method of
causing a user with legitimate access to an information system or information that is stored
on, processed by, or transiting an information system to unwittingly enable the defeat of a
security control or exploitation of a security vulnerability; (E) malicious cyber command and
control; (F) the actual or potential harm caused by an incident, including a description of
the information exfiltrated as a result of a particular cybersecurity threat; (G) any other attri-
bute of a cybersecurity threat, if disclosure of such attribute is not otherwise prohibited by
law; or (H) any combination thereof.” 6 U.S.C. § 1501(6) (2012).
97. Defensive Measure means “an action, device, procedure, signature, technique, or
other measure applied to an information system or information that is stored on, processed
by, or transiting an information system that detects, prevents, or mitigates a known or sus-
pected cybersecurity threat or security vulnerability.” 6 U.S.C. § 1501(7) (2012).
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government, so long as such sharing is for a cybersecurity
purpose.98
However, CISA places certain requirements on entities that par-
ticipate in the sharing of cyber threat indicators and defensive
measures.99 First, CISA requires that information sharing entities
implement appropriate security controls to protect the cyber threat
indicators and defensive measures that they share or receive from
unauthorized access or acquisition.100 Second, CISA requires that,
prior to sharing any cyber threat indicator or defensive measure,
participating entities must remove any personal information that is
not directly related to a cybersecurity threat.101  Third, CISA re-
quires that participating entities that share cyber threat indicators
or defensive measures with the federal government must do so us-
ing a DHS-certified sharing mechanism in order to benefit from the
statute’s  liability protection.102 While the statute shields private en-
tities from liability for the purposes of sharing cyber threat
information, it does not protect against all causes of action. Once
an entity shares information through the DHS capability, however,
other federal entities may then communicate with the non-federal
entity regarding that specific information without losing liability
protection.103
In addition to protection from liability for any cause of action
arising from the monitoring of information systems and the sharing
or receipt of cyber threat indicators, CISA also provides a number
of other protections, including exemptions from: (1) federal anti-
trust laws; (2) federal and state disclosure laws; (3) use by any
federal, state, tribal, or local government for the purpose of regulat-
ing a private entity; (4) waiver of any applicable privilege; and (5)
the rules of any federal agency pertaining to ex parte communica-
tions.104 CISA also permits participating entities to designate shared
information as commercial, financial, and proprietary.105
98. Cybersecurity Purpose means “the purpose of protecting an information system or
information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system from a cyber-
security threat or security vulnerability.” 6 U.S.C. § 1501(4) (2012). A “cybersecurity threat” is
“an action, not protected by the First Amendment . . . , on or through an information system
that may result in an unauthorized effort to adversely impact the security, availability, confi-
dentiality, or integrity of an information system or information that is stored on, processed
by, or transiting an information system.” 6 U.S.C. § 1501(5) (2012).
99. 6 U.S.C. § 1503(d) (2012).
100. 6 U.S.C. § 1503(d)(1) (2012).
101. 6 U.S.C. § 1503(d)(2) (2012).
102. 6 U.S.C. § 1505 (2012).
103. 6 U.S.C. § 1504 (2012).
104. 6 U.S.C. § 1503 (2012).
105. 6 U.S.C. § 1504(d)(2) (2012).
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II. STRUCTURED THREAT INFORMATION EXPRESSION AND TRUSTED
AUTOMATED EXCHANGE OF INDICATOR INFORMATION
(STIX AND TAXII)
One of the seemingly intentional goals of the legislation was to
increase automated information sharing, both by requiring DHS to
build an “automated process” to share information with other agen-
cies and to accept and share information in an automated manner,
and requiring an automated privacy scrub of the information
shared by the private sector.106  Automation allowed entities to
share and act upon an exponentially greater amount of threat in-
formation while compensating for the shortage of staff available to
process the information. In order to ensure that automated
processing of information could happen in real time, DHS needed
to select a technical standard by which it would receive this infor-
mation and share it through information sharing organizations.
The standard DHS chose to define cyber threat information is
called Structured Threat Information eXpression (“STIX”); its
counterpart for exchanging information is known as Trusted Auto-
mated Exchange of Indicator Information (“TAXII”).107
Prior to the development of STIX and TAXII, entities that
shared cyber threat indicators generally shared this information
from person to person, rather than machine to machine, and only
shared a limited amount of information within specific communi-
ties or using specific technology.108 Human-to-human sharing can
be time consuming, involving manual sharing processes and requir-
ing translation of threat information into a variety of formats.109
Such sharing has also frequently involved the use of insecure trans-
mission methods.110 Where machine-to-machine sharing was being
used, it was limited to relatively specific indicators, such as IP ad-
dresses, without sufficient context for an entity to take effective
action.111 STIX and TAXII grew out of a perceived need within the
cybersecurity community for greater structure and uniformity
around the sharing of cyber threat indicators to allow such sharing
106. 6 U.S.C. § 1504(d)(5)(C) (2012).
107. Information Sharing Specifications for Cybersecurity, U.S. COMPUT. EMERGENCY READINESS
TEAM, https://www.us-cert.gov/Information-Sharing-Specifications-Cybersecurity (last visited
Apr. 9, 2017).
108. JULIE CONNOLLY ET AL., MITRE CORP., THE TRUSTED AUTOMATED EXCHANGE OF INDICA-
TOR INFORMATION 10 (2012) https://taxii.mitre.org/about/documents/Introduction_to_
TAXII_White_Paper_November_2012.pdf [hereinafter TAXII TECHNICAL PAPER].
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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to include a broader set of information and to enable distribution
across industry sectors and product boundaries.112
Beginning in 2012, DHS engaged the broader cybersecurity com-
munity through the Homeland Security Systems Engineering &
Development Institute operated by the MITRE Corporation to de-
velop the necessary tools to facilitate broader sharing of cyber
threat indicators.113 Out of this effort, DHS established STIX and
TAXII for machine-to-machine communication and transmission of
cyber threat information.114 STIX is the structured language or for-
mat used to convey cyber threat information,115 while TAXII is the
standardized platform for the trusted exchange of such informa-
tion.116 In 2015, both STIX and TAXII were transitioned to OASIS,
a nonprofit consortium that facilitates the development and adop-
tion of open standards.117 In this role, OASIS will continue to
receive input from the cybersecurity community to further develop
and refine the STIX and TAXII constructs.118
The development of STIX was guided by a set of principles, in-
cluding: (1) expressivity; (2) integration; (3) flexibility; (4)
extensibility; (5) automatability; and (6) readability.119  Pursuant to
these principles, DHS aimed to develop a language that would al-
low for the communication of a full range of cyber threat
information; that would be both machine-readable to allow for au-
tomated sharing and human-readable so that security analysts could
efficiently use the information; that integrated existing standards
where possible;120 and that allowed users to adopt only those por-
tions of the language that they needed.121 In short, DHS sought to
112. STIX/TAXII STANDARDS TRANSITION—FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1, https://stix-
project.github.io/oasis-faq.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2017).
113. See TAXII TECHNICAL PAPER, supra note 108, at 1.
114. MITRE CORP., STANDARDIZING CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WITH THE
STRUCTURED INFORMATION EXPRESSION 1 (2012) https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/
publications/stix.pdf [hereinafter STIX TECHNICAL PAPER].
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. STIX/TAXII STANDARDS TRANSITION—FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note
112, at 1.
118. Id.
119. See STIX TECHNICAL PAPER, supra note 114, at 8–10.
120. STIX incorporates Cyber Observable eXpression (“CybOX”) to convey information
about observables, it leverages Indicator Exchange eXpression (“IndEX”) to convey informa-
tion about indicators, and it incorporates Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and
Classification (“CAPEC”) and Malware Attribute Enumeration and Characterization
(“MAEC”) to convey information about tactics, techniques, and procedures. It also leverages
existing standards for the communication of exploit targets, such as Common Vulnerabilities
and Exposures (“CVE”) and the Open Source Vulnerability Database (“OSVDB”). Id. at
11–14.
121. Id.
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create a common language for relating a broad range of cyber
threat information, such as cyber observables, indicators, incidents,
tactics, techniques, and procedures, exploit targets, courses of ac-
tion, campaigns, and cyber threat actors.122
TAXII defines a set of services and message exchanges that, when
implemented, enable sharing of actionable cyber threat informa-
tion across organizations and product/service boundaries.123 TAXII
eliminates the need for custom sharing solutions with each sharing
partner, and is designed to integrate into a variety of existing shar-
ing models, including: (1) hub and spoke networks, (2) source/
subscriber arrangements, and (3) peer-to-peer sharing.124
STIX/TAXII have seen broad adoption amongst businesses,
ISAOs, and Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC).125
Businesses, including BrightPoint Security, IBM, Microsoft, Intel,
Lockheed Martin, Palo Alto Networks, Inc., RSA Security, Hewlett
Packard, and Soltra, have already integrated STIX/TAXII into their
products.126 Similarly, many ISAOs and ISACs have begun using
STIX/TAXII, including the Defense Industrial Base ISAO, the In-
dustrial Control System ISAO, the National Health ISAC, and the
Retail ISAC.127
III. AUTOMATED INDICATOR SHARING
CISA provides that “[n]o cause of action shall lie” with respect to
the sharing of cyber threat information through a DHS-certified
sharing mechanism or capability that is otherwise consistent with
the statute (i.e., for a cybersecurity purpose and void of personally
identifiable information not directly related to the threat).128  Ac-
cordingly, pursuant to Section 105(c) of the Act, DHS developed
and certified the operation of a public and private sector sharing
process for cyber threat indicators and defensive measures via the
following methods: the Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS) initia-
tive, a web form, email, and other DHS information sharing
programs that use these means of receiving cyber threat indicators
122. Id.
123. See Information Sharing Specifications for Cybersecurity, supra note 107.
124. MARK DAVIDSON & CHARLES SCHMIDT, MITRE CORP., TAXII OVERVIEW: 1.1 3–4 (2014),
https://taxiiproject.github.io/releases/1.1/TAXII_Overview.pdf.
125. See STIX/TAXII Supporters List (Archive), STIX PROJECT DOCUMENTATION, http://stix-
project.github.io/supporters/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2017).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 6 U.S.C. § 1505 (2012).
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or defensive measures.129 Non-federal entities may also share cyber
threat indicators and defensive measures with federal entities
through ISACs or ISAOs, which may share them with federal enti-
ties through DHS on their behalf.130  Sharing through any of these
means is eligible for liability protection; however, this Article fo-
cuses on the use of the AIS system and STIX/TAXII framework as a
means of securing liability protection in the cyber threat informa-
tion sharing context.
Managed by the NCCIC, AIS enables the timely exchange of
cyber threat intelligence information—i.e., cyber threat indicators
and defensive measures—between the federal government and the
private sector by leveraging the STIX/TAXII specifications for ma-
chine-to-machine communications.131 In short, as soon as a private
company or federal agency observes a cyber threat, AIS allows for
the bidirectional sharing of the cyber threat information in real
time with all AIS participants, including the private sector, state,
local, tribal, territorial governments, and the federal government.132
The ultimate goal of AIS is to commoditize cyber threat informa-
tion such that cyber threat indicators and defensive measures are
shared broadly among the public and private sector, enabling every-
one to better protect against cyber attacks.133
In order to receive, analyze, process, and disseminate cyber
threat information in real time, AIS uses the STIX/TAXII specifica-
tions for the format and exchange of information.134 AIS enables
participants to share cyber threat information in a secure, anony-
mous,135 and automated manner.136 Accordingly, in order to
129. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE TO ASSIST NON-
FEDERAL ENTITIES TO SHARE CYBER THREAT INDICATORS AND DEFENSIVE MEASURES WITH FED-
ERAL ENTITIES UNDER THE CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION SHARING ACT OF 2015 13–14 (2016),
https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/ais_files/Non-Federal_Entity_Sharing_Guidance
_(Sec%20105(a)).pdf [hereinafter GUIDANCE TO ASSIST NON-FEDERAL ENTITIES]
130. Id. at 14.
131. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS), https://
www.dhs.gov/ais (last updated June 21, 2016). DHS certified the deployment of its AIS capa-
bility for cyber threat information sharing on March 17, 2016. DHS “Open for Business” to
Receive Cyber Threat Indicators at Machine Speed, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. BLOG (Mar. 17,
2016, 5:15 PM), https://www.dhs.gov/blog/2016/03/17/dhs-open-business-receive-cyber-
threat-indicators-machine-speed.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS), U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.us-
cert.gov/sites/default/files/ais_files/AIS_fact_sheet.pdf.
135. Participants who share indicators through AIS are not identified as the source of the
information to other participants unless they affirmatively consent to the disclosure of their
identity.
136. See GUIDANCE TO ASSIST NON-FEDERAL ENTITIES, supra note 129, at 14.
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directly participate in the real-time sharing capability of AIS, partici-
pants need to acquire their own TAXII client to communicate with
the DHS TAXII server and submit information in conformance
with the AIS STIX Profile as discussed in detail below.137
AIS participants are also required to follow the AIS Terms of
Use138 and DHS submission guidance139 that outlines the type of
information that should and should not be provided when submit-
ting cyber threat indicators or defensive measures through AIS.140
Specifically, information provided must not contain any personally
identifiable information (PII) unless it is directly related to the
cybersecurity threat.141 Accordingly, DHS uses the AIS STIX Pro-
file142 to standardize the indicator and defensive measure
information and implement a series of automated and manual
processes to ensure that PII is removed from the cyber threat indi-
cator or defensive measure before it is disseminated, thereby
minimizing privacy, civil liberty, and other concerns that may arise
when PII and other sensitive information is submitted.143
The AIS STIX Profile limits the information that can be disclosed
when sharing a cyber threat indicator or defensive measure by re-
moving the STIX fields that could contain PII.144  STIX includes
more than 2,750 fields that can be used to convey information
about cyber threat indicators; however, the AIS profile includes
only 364 of these fields.145 Limiting the number of available fields
reduces the risk that PII will be disclosed and ensures a level of
predictability in the AIS submission content, such that automated
controls can be used to further screen the submission.146
Once the information is received, AIS performs a series of auto-
mated analyses to ensure that the information within the data fields
137. Id.
138. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY AUTOMATED INDICATOR SHARING TERMS OF
USE, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/ais_files/
AIS_Terms_of_Use.pdf.
139. See e.g., GUIDANCE TO ASSIST NON-FEDERAL ENTITIES, supra note 129, at 13–14.
140. Id.
141. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT STATEMENT FOR AUTOMATED INFORMA-
TION SHARING (AIS) 2 (2016), https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/ais_files/PIA_NP
PD-AIS.pdf [hereinafter AIS PRIVACY IMPACT STATEMENT].
142. See generally AIS STIX Profile, U.S. COMPUT. EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM (Dec. 30,
2016), https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/ais_files/AIS_Submission_Guidance_
Appendix_A.pdf.
143. See AIS PRIVACY IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 141, at 2.
144. Id. at 5 n.18.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 6.
908 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 50:4
meets certain predetermined criteria and does not contain unre-
lated PII.147 These technical controls include, but are not limited to:
schema restrictions, controlled vocabulary, regular expressions (i.e.
pattern matching), known good values, and autogenerated text.148
While the majority of AIS submissions are automatically processed,
there are instances (e.g., an unrecognized value) where the particu-
lar field will be queued for human review.149 In such cases, human
analysts at the NCCIC review the information and determine the
appropriate actions to be taken (e.g., verify there is no PII or manu-
ally delete identified PII).150
IV. CISA GUIDANCE
To facilitate the sharing of cyber threat indicators and defensive
measures by private entities through AIS and other certified capa-
bilities, CISA further required that the Attorney General and the
Secretary of Homeland Security jointly develop guidelines for the
sharing of such information with the federal government.151 The
statute required that the DOJ and DHS issue interim policies and
procedures within sixty days of the statute’s enactment and final
guidelines within 180 days of enactment.152  The DOJ and DHS is-
sued their preliminary guidelines on February 16, 2016 and the
final guidelines on June 15, 2016.153 The guidelines included four
documents: (1) the Operational Procedures,154 (2) the Non-Federal
Entity Sharing Guidance,155 (3) the Federal Entity Sharing Gui-
dance,156 and (4) the Privacy and Civil Liberties Guidelines.157 A
147. Id. at 5.
148. Id. at 6.
149. Id. at 7.
150. Id.
151. 6 U.S.C. § 1504 (2012).
152. 6 U.S.C. § 1504(a) (2012).
153. Id.
154. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FINAL PROCEDURES RELATED
TO THE RECEIPT OF CYBER THREAT INDICATORS AND DEFENSIVE MEASURES BY THE FEDERAL GOV-
ERNMENT (2016), https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/ais_files/Operational_
Procedures_%28105%28a%29%29.pdf.
155. GUIDANCE TO ASSIST NON-FEDERAL ENTITIES, supra note 129.
156. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE ET AL., SHARING CYBER THREAT INDICA-
TORS AND DEFENSIVE MEASURES BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT UNDER THE CYBERSECURITY
INFORMATION SHARING ACT OF 2015 (2016), https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/
ais_files/Federal_Government_Sharing_Guidance_%28103%29.pdf.
157. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
FINAL GUIDELINES: CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION SHARING ACT OF 2015 (2016), https://www.us-
cert.gov/sites/default/files/ais_files/Privacy_and_Civil_Liberties_Guidelines_%28Sec%20
105%28b%29%29.pdf [hereinafter PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES FINAL GUIDELINES].
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significant public record has not yet developed regarding the recep-
tion of the guidelines by industry, however industry has spoken
favorably about the guidelines.158
The Non-Federal Entity Sharing Guidance (Guidance) distin-
guishes the types of information that qualify as a cyber threat
indicator under the Act and the types of information protected by
otherwise applicable privacy laws.159 The Guidance also explains
how to identify and share cyber threat indicators and defensive
measures with federal entities through the federal government ca-
pability and process operated by DHS.160 The Guidance states that
CISA promotes the sharing of cybersecurity information while pro-
tecting privacy by specifying the types of cyber threat indicators that
can be shared and by limiting information sharing under the Act to
only those circumstances in which the information is necessary to
describe or identify threats to information and information sys-
tems.161 The Guidance also provides a number of examples of
information that would contain cyber threat indicators that a pri-
vate entity could share with the federal government.162 The
Guidance further identifies a number of examples of defensive
measures that a private entity could share under CISA,163 as well as
several types of information that are protected under otherwise ap-
plicable privacy laws that are unlikely to be directly related to a
cybersecurity threat, including protected health information,
human resource information, and financial information, among
others.164 Finally, the Guidance explains how private entities must
share cyber threat indicators and defensive measures with the fed-
eral government to take advantage of the liability protection made
available by the statute.165 Participation in AIS is not the only way
for a private entity to be shielded from criminal and civil liability
with respect to information sharing. However, the Guidance care-
fully avoids explaining the other ways to achieve liability protection
beyond using AIS, presumably because DHS wants to promote AIS
uptake.
158. See Notice of Public Workshop Regarding the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act
of 2015 Implementation, 81 Fed. Reg 32,340 (May 23, 2016).
159. GUIDANCE TO ASSIST NON-FEDERAL ENTITIES, supra note 129. The guidance provides
several ways to share information. This paper is specifically focused on automated sharing.
160. Id. at 10.
161. Id. at 5.
162. Id. at 5–6.
163. Id. at 7.
164. Id. at 9–10.
165. Id. at 10.
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The DOJ and DHS also issued guidelines pertaining to privacy
and civil liberties (Guidelines) with respect to the receipt, reten-
tion, use, and dissemination of cyber threat indicators by a federal
entity.166 The Guidelines state that cyber threat indicators provided
to the federal government under CISA may be disclosed to, re-
tained by, and used by any federal agency only for activities that
have been authorized under the Act.167 The Guidelines also provide
that federal agencies must review cyber threat indicators before
sharing them to determine whether the indicator contains any in-
formation that is not directly related to a cybersecurity threat and
that the agency knows, or has reason to know, is personal informa-
tion.168  The Guidelines also apply the Fair Information Practice
Principles to the sharing of cyber threat indicators with the federal
government.169 The Guidelines further address destruction require-
ments, notification procedures, use restrictions, safeguards, and the
dissemination of such information, as required by statute.170
Although the Guidance and Guidelines pertain to the sharing of
cyber threat indicators and defensive measures with the federal gov-
ernment, they also provide helpful guidance for the sharing of such
information between private entities. Importantly, the Guidelines
clarify that private entities can receive liability protection when
sharing cyber threat indicators and defensive measures with other
private entities if they would receive such protection under CISA
for sharing the same information with the federal government.171
Therefore, so long as an entity complies with the requirements
under CISA for obtaining liability protection, that entity is not lim-
ited with respect to whom can receive such information.
The Guidelines also provide a framework for how private entities
should structure any arrangement to share covered information
under CISA. Specifically, to take advantage of the liability protec-
tion afforded under the statute, private entities should share threat
indicators and defensive measures using the AIS STIX Profile and
TAXII. In adopting this approach, private entities can conclude
that they are meeting CISA’s requirements without performing a
time-consuming, manual review of each submission before sharing
it with other parties. To benefit from CISA’s liability protection, pri-
vate entities must not only engage in the types of sharing that are
covered by the statute, but they also must review any information
166. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES FINAL GUIDELINES, supra note 157.
167. Id. at 10.
168. Id. at 12.
169. Id. at 4.
170. Id. at 7–12.
171. GUIDANCE TO ASSIST NON-FEDERAL ENTITIES, supra note 129, at 10 n.11.
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that will be shared with other entities before sharing it and remove
any information that is not directly related to a cybersecurity threat
that the private entity knows is PII.
Implementing this review process to benefit from the statute’s
liability protection could significantly increase the level of effort
that companies must invest to be able to share cyber threat indica-
tors and defensive measures with other private entities. Employing
a manual process to review information before sharing it with other
parties would be both time consuming and could lead to mistakes
that would result in an entity losing liability protection.
To efficiently share covered information without incurring liabil-
ity, private entities should use the AIS STIX Profile to structure the
information that they provide, and they should use TAXII to struc-
ture the transmission. Using the AIS STIX Profile will be
particularly helpful because it will only allow the submission of in-
formation that DHS has already determined meets the statute’s
requirements for liability protection. Following this process will en-
able private entities to share covered information efficiently and
confidently, while limiting any risk associated with such sharing.
Conversely, when a private entity does not use AIS limitations to
share covered information, that entity may not be protected from
liability, even though the entity used STIX/TAXII. Under the Gui-
dance, using STIX/TAXII alone is insufficient for a private entity to
be protected from liability.
CONCLUSION
In their guidance, DHS and DOJ have provided a clear pathway
for companies to obtain liability protection by utilizing certain
STIX fields, set forward in AIS, when automating information shar-
ing with the federal government. Because DHS and DOJ have made
clear that the steps that apply to the government sharing also apply
to private sector sharing, organizations may take comfort in know-
ing that limiting sharing to the AIS STIX fields will afford them a
greater degree of liability protection. Organizations that decide not
to utilize STIX to automate sharing may still use the AIS STIX Pro-
file to map fields to help ensure that they are protecting privacy as
the law requires. Organizations that take this approach may want to
work with DHS to assure themselves that the resulting profile
closely tracks to the AIS profile in order effectively to take advan-
tage of the liability protections in the law when using automated
sharing.
